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Abstract
We study team decision problems where communication is not possible, but coordination
among team members can be realized via signals in a shared environment. We consider a variety
of decision problems that differ in what team members know about one another’s actions and
knowledge. For each type of decision problem, we investigate how different assumptions on
the available signals affect team performance. Specifically, we consider the cases of perfectly
correlated, i.i.d., and exchangeable classical signals, as well as the case of quantum signals. We
find that, whereas in perfect-recall trees (Kuhn [13, 1950], [14, 1953]) no type of signal improves
performance, in imperfect-recall trees quantum signals may bring an improvement. Isbell [11,
1957] proved that in non-Kuhn trees, classical i.i.d. signals may improve performance. We show
that further improvement may be possible by use of classical exchangeable or quantum signals.
We include an example of the effect of quantum signals in the context of high-frequency trading.
1 Introduction
A team is a group of agents unified by common goals. Characteristic of team problems is that
members of a team have access to different information depending on their local environments.
Communication of this information among team members may or may not be possible, depending
on economic and physical constraints. An example of the latter arise in high-frequency trading (see
Pagnotta and Philippon [19, 2012] for a survey), where messaging across widely dispersed members of
a team would be too slow to be useful. In this paper, we study scenarios where direct communication
is indeed unavailable, but team members can use a shared global environment to achieve highly
effective coordination. We undertake a systematic examination of how the informational properties
of the environment interact with the informational structure of a decision problem to bring about
changes in performance.
In the absence of communication, team problems become formally equivalent to one-agent de-
cision problems with memory limitations. This equivalence was noted by Marschak and Radner
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([17, 1972]) in their pioneering work on teams. We shall refer to these scenarios as team decision
problems. Figure 1 is a simple example.
I 
In In 
Out Out 
0 4 
1 
Figure 1
In the scenario accompanying this tree, there is a task that requires the completion of two
different steps in sequence. If the two steps are completed in the correct order, the payoff is 4. If
the second step is undertaken before the completion of the first, the payoff is 0. If the first step is
mistakenly repeated, the payoff is 1. There are two people assigned to the task and each has to act
without knowing if the other has already completed the first step. The tree of Figure 1 captures this
scenario. In particular, the two square nodes belong to the two team members, but the nodes are
enclosed in an information set I to capture the idea that they do not know whether they are acting
first or second.1
As a one-agent problem, this same scenario has been extensively discussed as the Absent-Minded
Driver’s Problem (Piccione and Rubinstein [20, 1997]). While the focus in that literature was
on conceptual aspects of this scenario, our interest is more ‘engineering-like.’ Specifically, we shall
investigate how well a team can perform tasks such as the above one, as a function of the assumptions
made on its shared environment.
A concrete example of how environmental information can affect performance in a decision prob-
lem of the type in Figure 1 was offered by Isbell [11, 1957]. He showed that if the players have
access to i.i.d. signals (payoff-irrelevant chance moves), then they can do better relative to no
signals. There are other possibilities. Members of a team might have access to exchangeable
(not necessarily i.i.d.) signals. Will this make a difference — in particular, will it allow still better
performance?
Another possibility is that the physical make-up of the environment matters. In other areas of
information theory, it is well-established that access to quantum rather than classical information
resources has profound consequences for various tasks. One main distinction between classical and
quantum signals is that they arise at different physical scales. Classical signals are encoded in the
macroscopic state of some physical system — for example, in an electrical current or light beam
(or even in smoke signals . . .). By contrast, quantum signals are encoded in the microscopic state
of a system — for example, in the spin of an electron or of a photon. Most importantly, quantum
signals can exhibit patterns of behavior that are impossible with any choice of classical signals. In
particular, quantum signals may be not only correlated but even entangled, where this term refers
to exotic correlations that cannot arise in the classical case.2
While quantum signals permeate any physical environment, their controlled use as information
1In the tradition of Savage [23, 1954, p.13] and his famous example of making an omelette, we could think of our
task as flipping a frittata precisely once. The task is to be performed by two distracted cooks, so that neither knows
if the other has yet completed the task. Of course, one flip is best (payoff of 4), two flips leads to an overdone dish
(payoff of 1), and no flip leaves the eggs undercooked (payoff of 0).
2The paper is self-contained in that we will describe later the (little) physics the reader will need. This said,
Susskind [25, 2012] is an excellent introduction to the phenomenon of quantum entanglement.
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resources has only recently become possible and implementable. One case in which quantum tech-
niques has already entered the practical arena is quantum cryptography (Qiu [22, 2014]), where the
security of communication is protected by the very laws of Nature; by contrast, analogous classical
schemes do not offer similar guarantees. In computer science, there are important quantum algo-
rithms that have been proved superior to classical algorithms (Deutsch-Jozsa [6, 1992], Grover [8,
1996], Shor [24, 1997]). Could it be that in the area of decision making, as in cryptography and
computing, the availability of quantum resources might lead to improved performance over what
is possible in a classical environment? We will identify conditions under which this is indeed the
case. This may not be of theoretical interest alone. We will come back later to the example of
high-frequency trading, where access to quantum resources could have practical significance.
Team problems with classical signals have been studied by Lehrer, Rosenberg, and Shmaya
[16, 2010]. Their focus is on signals which are informative about the underlying (‘physical’) state,
while our interest is in signals as coordinating devices when there is a fixed information structure
concerning the underlying state. La Mura [15, 2005] provides an example of a team problem where
quantum signals yield an improvement over classical signals. (We make use of this example later.)
Kargin [12, 2008] provides a necessary condition for quantum signals to yield no improvement in a
specific family of team problems.
2 Results
Kuhn [13, 1950], [14, 1953] introduced into decision theory the fundamental distinction between
perfect and imperfect recall. Isbell [11, 1957] extended this classification further to include other
trees with limited recall, which do not belong to the family of Kuhn trees. Those include decision
problems in which, as in the example of Figure 1, an information set may contain nodes which are
met in sequence. We will call these Isbell trees. This classification is equally important in team
decision problems, where it refers to the availability or unavailability of information about what
other team members do or know. This three-way taxonomy of decision problems — perfect-recall
Kuhn, imperfect-recall Kuhn, Isbell — is the one we will use.
I 
Left Right Left Right 
Figure 2
We now add a framework for talking about the different kinds of signals to which members
of a team might have access. In the simplest case, there is one signal per information set. But
this is restrictive and does not fit well with cases where the different nodes in a given information
set could be widely separated from one another in space or time. In such cases, it may be more
appropriate to think of distinct but perfectly correlated signals operating at different nodes within
the same information set. In fact, other assumptions on signals are possible that still preserve the
indistinguishability of nodes in an information set. In particular, the signals could be i.i.d., but,
more generally, we can require them to be exchangeable.3 Figure 2 depicts an information set in
3Two random variables are exchangeable if their joint distribution is invariant under permutation (Billingsley [3,
1995, p.473].
3
some tree. Figure 3a is the simple case where one coin is tossed at this information set and the
choices can be pegged on the outcome of the toss. Figure 3b depicts two coins, one per node, where
the coins are exchangeable (which includes the case they are i.i.d.).
Left Right 
Heads Tails Heads Tails 
Left Right 
Left Right Left Right 
SAME COIN 
Figure 3a
Left Right 
Heads Tails Heads Tails 
Left Right 
Left Right Left Right 
EXCHANGEABLE 
COINS 
Figure 3b
Within information sets, there are some clear considerations of indistinguishability. We also need
to consider what are the appropriate conditions to impose on signals across information sets. We
will want to know how these conditions, too, affect the potential performance in a task. To uncover
these capabilities, it becomes important to specify the physical embodiment of the signals that are
available. In particular, what correlations across signals are possible fundamentally depends on
whether the signal carrier obeys classical or quantum physical laws.
Table 1 shows, for each type of decision problem we consider, the effect on team performance
of different assumptions about the type of signals available. We denote in green the baseline per-
formance which can be achieved in all types of problem with no signals. Along a given row, higher
performance is indicated by moving from green to orange to yellow to red (as in a heat map). Our
results can be summarized as follows. For perfect-recall Kuhn trees, no type of signal brings any
improvement over the baseline. For imperfect-recall Kuhn trees, no classical signal type (perfectly
correlated, i.i.d., or exchangeable) can improve over the baseline, but quantum signals may do so.
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Type of signal 
None or 
perfectly 
correlated 
i.i.d. Exchangeable Quantum 
Type of decision 
problem 
Perfect-recall 
Kuhn 
Imperfect-
recall Kuhn 
Isbell 
Table 1
For Isbell trees, classical i.i.d. signals improve over the baseline, exchangeable signs improve further,
and quantum signals still further.
We see from the table that in situations where communication among members of a team would
be helpful but is unavailable, signals can act as substitutes, at least in part. Another implication
of our results is that decision making is not invariant to the physical embodiment of the decision
environment. In particular, we see that access to quantum signals may yield improvements over any
choice of classical signals. We will make last point more concrete via an example later in the paper.
3 Signal Structures
Figure 4 depicts a team decision problem which begins with a chance move. This is represented
by a circular node belonging to Nature, where the numbers in parentheses give the probabilities of
Nature’s move. One team member, Ann, moves at information set I1, and the other member, Bob,
moves at I2. When Ann moves, she knows that Nature chose left. But, when Bob moves, he does
not know whether Nature chose right, or Nature chose left and then Ann chose In. Thus, Ann may
have information — that Nature chose left and she chose In — that Bob does not get. In terms
of our three-way taxonomy, the team problem is a Kuhn tree with imperfect recall. The reader
should refer to Definitions A.1 (Kuhn tree) and A.4 (perfect recall) in Appendix A to check this last
statement.
The team’s expected payoffs are: 2/3 from the pair of strategies (In, Left), 4/3 from (In, Right),
1/3 from (Out, Left), and 5/3 from Out, Right). The team’s highest expected payoff is therefore
5/3.
Figure 5 adds two signals, in the form of coin tosses, to Figure 4. There is one coin toss at
information set I1, with outcomes Heads1 and Tails1, and another coin toss at I2, with outcomes
Heads2 and Tails2. Ann can make her choice at I1 contingent on the outcome of the coin toss at I1.
Likewise, Bob can make his choice at I2 contingent on the outcome of the coin toss at I2.
It will be convenient to describe the probability structure of the coin tosses in the following way.
Each possible path through a tree crosses certain information sets of the team members in a certain
order. A signal structure associates to each sequence of information sets that arises in this fashion,
a probability measure on the product space of the associated signals. In Figure 5, the sequences of
information sets that can arise are I1, I2, and I1I2. Figure 6 gives the general form of the associated
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left right 
Left Left Right Right 
Out In 
2 0 0 2 
1 
(2/3) (1/3) 
I2 
I1 
Figure 4
probability measures. Here α through θ are numbers between 0 and 1 satisfying α+β = 1, γ+δ = 1,
and + ζ + η + θ = 1.
2 
Left 
Heads2 Tails2 Tails2 Heads2 Heads2 Tails2 
Right 
0 
0 
Left Right 
2 
2 
Left Right 
0 
0 
Left Right 
2 
2 
Left Right 
0 
2 
Left Right 
0 
left right 
In 
1 
(2/3) (1/3) 
Heads1 Tails1 
Out In 
1 
Out 
Figure 5
Consider the following strategies for the team. At her information set, Ann chooses Out if her
coin comes up Heads1, and In if her coin comes up Tails1. At his information set, Bob chooses Left
if his coin comes up Heads2, and Right if his coin comes up Tails2. The team’s expected payoff is
then:
1/3× (α× 1 + η × 2 + θ × 0) + 2/3× (γ × 0 + δ × 2).
If α = 0, δ = 1 (so that γ = 0), and η = 1 (so that θ = 0), then the team gets an expected payoff of
2, which is greater than the best possible (5/3) without signals.
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H2 T2 
H1 ε ζ 
T1 η θ 
PrI1I2
H2 T2 
γ δ 
H1 T1 
α β 
PrI1 PrI2
Figure 6
On a closer look, it is apparent that the information structure of Figure 6 when α = 0 and
δ = η = 1 is conceptually unsatisfactory. The second coin comes up Heads (H2) almost surely if it
is tossed after the first coin has been tossed, but comes up Tails (T2) almost surely if it is tossed
when the first coin has not been tossed. If we allow this amount of information ‘flow’ between the
two coins, it is not surprising that we can engineer an improvement over the case of no coins. Our
interest is in situations where such direct communication is impossible. What is needed, then, is a
condition that rules out such information flow or communication, without going so far as to rule out
all correlation across signals. The next section presents a suitable condition.
4 Indistinguishability
We want a condition that applies across information sets and that is in line with the basic require-
ment that nodes within an information set are indistinguishable. Suppose, for a moment, that the
outcomes of a signal at one information set could reveal, probabilistically at least, which other signals
are activated elsewhere in the tree. Then, simply by observation of the signal, a team member at
a given information set might learn something — probabilistically, say — about which node in the
information set was reached. (This was the case in the example of Figures 5 and 6. If Bob observes
H2, then he knows almost surely he is at the middle node of I2. If he observes T2, he knows almost
surely he is at the right-hand node of I2.) Here is the formal condition to rule out this possibility:
Indistinguishability Condition Consider two sequences of information sets and the
two associated signal probability measures. The marginals of these two measures — with
respect to common subsequences — must agree.
Let’s see how this condition works in the signal structure of Figure 6. Looking at the two se-
quences I1 and I1I2, with common subsequence I1, we see that the condition is that the probabilities
of H1 must be equal: α = + ζ. Likewise, looking at the two sequences I2 and I1I2, with common
subsequence I2, we see that the condition is that the probabilities of H2 must be equal: γ = + η.
Of course, the first (resp. second) condition implies that the probabilities of T1 (resp. T2) are also
equal.
Indistinguishability rules out the choice of parameters α = 0 and δ = η = 1 we had before in
Figure 6. (This choice contradicts γ =  + η.) We can go further. Indistinguishability reduces the
five free parameters in Figure 6 to three, which we will take to be , ζ, and η (we will still write
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θ = 1− − ζ − η). The expected payoff under the previous strategy can then be written as:
× (1/3× 1 + 2/3× 0) + ζ × (1/3× 1 + 2/3× 2) + η× (1/3× 2 + 2/3× 0) + θ× (1/3× 0 + 2/3× 2).
Since this is a convex combination of expected payoffs to the team in the tree without signals, we
see that no improvement in the team’s (maximum) expected payoff is now possible under signals.
The same is easily seen to be true for any other strategy for the tree of Figure 5.
5 Classicality
The example of the previous section might suggest that, provided the indistinguishability condition
is satisfied, the addition of signals to a (Kuhn) decision problem can never result in an increase
in the team’s maximum expected payoff. Table 1 tells us that this is false once quantum signals
are allowed. We will see an example of this phenomenon in the next section. Before that, we will
establish the correct baseline for signals to yield no improvement in Kuhn trees.
Fix a Kuhn tree, let I1, I2, . . . be the information sets for the DM and ΩI1 ,ΩI2 , . . . be associated
finite signal sets which we add.4 Write Ω = ΩI1 × ΩI2 × · · · .
Classicality Condition There is a probability measure µ on Ω such that for each subse-
quence Ii1Ii2 · · · IiK of information sets that arises in the tree, the associated probability
measure is given by:
PrIi1Ii2 ···IiK = margΩIi1×ΩIi2×···×ΩIiK
µ.
Note that this condition is well-defined since, in a Kuhn tree, each path through the tree crosses a
given information set at most once. Classicality says that there is a joint probability space (Ω, µ)
from which a given signal structure, of the kind we explored in the previous section, can be derived.
It is immediate from the properties of marginals that:
Proposition 5.1 Classicality implies indistinguishability.
Next, let MI1 ,MI2 , . . . be the sets of moves at the information sets I1, I2, . . . respectively, and
write M = MI1 ×MI2 × · · · .
Proposition 5.2 Fix a Kuhn tree. The highest expected payoff a team can achieve with signals
satisfying classicality is the same as that without signals.
Proof. A strategy profile for the team in the underlying tree is an element m ∈M . A strategy profile
for the team in the extended tree with signals is a tuple of maps fI1 : ΩI1 →MI1 , fI2 : ΩI2 →MI2 , . . ..
Write f = fI1 × fI2 × · · · . Also, write pi(m) for the expected payoff to the team in the underlying
tree, when it chooses strategy profile m and we average over Nature. Then, the expected payoff
to the team in the extended tree, when it chooses strategy profile f (and we again average over
Nature), is
∑
m∈M (µ ◦ f−1)(m) × pi(m). That is, in the tree with signals, the expected payoff to
any particular strategy profile is a convex combination of expected payoffs to strategy profile in the
underlying tree.
This argument applies when there is one signal per information set. Since in a Kuhn tree, every
path from the root to a terminal node passes through a given information set at most once, it
4If there is no signal at an information set, the signal space is a singleton. For simplicity, we restrict attention to
finite signal sets.
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immediately extends to the case of multiple signals per information set, whether these signals are
perfectly correlated, i.i.d., or exchangeable.
Throughout, we assume independence between Nature (in the underlying tree) and signals. In-
dependence seems like the right assumption for our purpose. We do not want signals to give the
team information it never had. When independence is violated, Proposition 5.1 may fail. Appendix
B provides an example of such a case.
In decision theory (and game theory), one normally takes for granted the existence of a joint
probability space that yields whatever signals one has in mind. This makes sense in the classical
physical world where every physical mechanism can be associated with an appropriate joint proba-
bility space. But it may fail in the quantum realm. It turns out that existence or non-existence of
this joint space actually defines the classical-quantum divide (Fine [7, 1982], Abramsky and Bran-
denburger [1, 2011]). This is the reason behind the naming of our classicality condition.
6 Quantum Improvement
We now show:
Proposition 6.1 There is a Kuhn tree (with imperfect recall) in which the team can achieve a
higher expected payoff with quantum signals than with any classical signals.
Up1 
(1/4) (1/4) 
(1/4) (1/4) 
0 
0 
I1 I2 
Down1 
I3 Up3 
Down3 
0 
−M 
Up3 
Down3 
Up1 0 
Down1 
Up4 
Down4 
0 Up4 
Down4 
−M 
0 
Up2 
Down2 
Up3 
Down3 
−M 
0 
Up3 
Down3 
0 
0 
I4 
Up2 
Down2 
Up4 
Down4 
+m 
0 
Up4 
Down4 
0 
0 
Figure 7
The decision problem of Figure 7 will suffice to establish this claim. It represents a situation
in which two team members are imperfectly informed of Nature’s initial move and must coordinate
their actions. We assume that the payoffs satisfy 0 < m < M . We first show that the team’s
expected payoff with classical signals is at most 0. To see this, start without signals. Observe that
the only way for the team to get the +m payoff (with positive probability) is if it chooses Up2 at
information I2 and Up4 at information set I4. But then, to avoid the −M payoff on the right side
of the tree, it must choose Down3 at I3. Then, to avoid the upper −M payoff on the left side, it
must choose Up1 at I1. Then, to avoid the lower −M payoff on the left side, it must choose Down4
at I4, not Up4 as we supposed. It follows that the +m payoff cannot arise unless at least one −M
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payoff also arises. Moreover, it will arise with the same probability. Since M > m, we have shown
that the team’s expected payoff is at most 0. Now use Proposition 5.2 to conclude that the team’s
highest possible expected payoff in any extended tree with classical signals is also 0.
Next, consider the signal structure of Figure 8. Here, Φ = 2/(1 +
√
5) and is the inverse of the
Golden Ratio. One can check that our indistinguishability condition is satisfied (use the fact that
Φ2 + Φ = 1). Now consider the following strategy profile for the team in the extended tree: (i) at I1,
choose Up1 after H1 and Down1 after T1; (ii) at I2, choose Up2 after H2 and Down2 after T2; (iii)
at I3, choose Up3 after H3 and Down3 after T3; (iv) at I4, choose Up4 after H4 and Down4 after
T4. The team’s expected payoff from this strategy profile is 1/4× Φ5 ×m > 0. An improvement in
the team’s highest expected payoff is achieved.
H4 T4 
H1 0 Φ 
T1 Φ3 Φ4 
H3 T3 
H1 Φ3 Φ2 
T1 Φ2 0 
PrI1I3 H3 T3 
H2 0 Φ3 
T2 Φ Φ4 
PrI2I3
H4 T4 
H2 Φ5 Φ4 
T2 Φ4 Φ 
PrI2I4PrI1I4
Figure 8
By Proposition 5.2, we know that the signal structure of Figure 8 cannot be realized classically.
(This can also be verified directly; see Appendix C.) It can, however, be realized quantum mechan-
ically (see Hardy [9, 1993]). The physical mechanism involves the creation of what is called an
entangled pair of particles. The basic set-up is that two particles — two photons, for example —
are prepared in a special state and sent off on different trajectories. Each particle then enters a
detector, placed some distance from the source on that particle’s trajectory. Detectors have various
settings, and the setting chosen determines which property of a particle is measured. For example,
a detector might be set to measure the so-called spin of a photon along a particular direction. The
outcome of each measurement is binary and can take one of two values, conventionally labelled spin
+1 or spin −1.
Such a quantum system can be used to generate the signal structure of Figure 8. The spin of
one particle is measured at information set I1 or I2. It is measured along one direction at I1 and
along a different direction at I2. In either case, the measurement has two possible outcomes. We
call them Heads1 or Tails1, and Heads2 or Tails2, respectively. The spin of the second particle is
measured at information set I3 or I4. It is measured along one direction at I3 and along a different
direction at I4. Again, in either case, the measurement has two possible outcomes. We call them
Heads3 or Tails3, and Heads4 or Tails4, respectively. This gives us the form of the signal structure
of Figure 8. The specific probabilities come from the preparation of a particular entangled quantum
state (Hardy [9, 1993], Mermin [18, 1994]).
The choice of a tree with imperfect recall (Figure 7) and of a signal structure with indistinguisha-
bility (Figure 8) was quite deliberate. If a tree has perfect recall, then no signal — even quantum
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— can bring any improvement. This is not surprising since there is nothing for team members to
learn about one another; see Appendix A for a formal argument. As for indistinguishability, this
is a necessary feature of any signal structure that is built using quantum information resources.
This follows from an important property of quantum mechanics called “no signaling” (Popescu and
Rohrlich [21, 1996]).
7 Isbell Trees
We now examine a class of non-Kuhn trees first studied by Isbell [11, 1957]. We have already seen
an example of an Isbell tree in Figure 1. This will be the first example where it matters which
formulation of classical signals we choose.
We first dispatch the case of perfectly correlated signals. We argue that any strategy profile using
perfectly correlated signals cannot do better than a strategy that does not use any signals. Indeed,
observe that a strategy profile based on perfectly correlated signals cannot prescribe different moves
at two nodes in the same information set. But then, for each realization of the signal, the resulting
common move can be replicated as part of a (deterministic) strategy profile that simply prescribes
this common move at both nodes.
In Out 
Heads1 Tails1 
Heads2 Tails2 Heads2 Tails2 
Out 
Out Out Out Out 
In 
In In In In 
0 0 
4 4 4 4 
1 1 1 1 
Figure 9
It is no longer true that classical signals have no effect in Isbell trees, once we move from perfectly
correlated to i.i.d. signals. We review Isbell’s [11, 1957] argument. We go back to the tree of Figure
1 and extend it by adding two coins at the information set I. The extended tree is depicted in
Figure 9. The coin which is tossed at the root of the tree comes up Heads1 or Tails1, and the coin
tossed at the subsequent node comes up Heads2 or Tails2. The team has two information sets in
the extended tree — one where team members see a coin land Heads, and one where they see a coin
land Tails. The three nodes in the first information set are shaded with the right-side-up triangles,
and the three nodes in the second information set with upside-down triangles.
In this tree, with either no signals or perfectly correlated signals, the team’s best expected payoff
is 1 (from choosing In). Now let the signals be i.i.d., as in Figure 10a, and suppose team members
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adopt the strategy of choosing In at the first information set in Figure 9 (right-side-up triangles)
and Out at the second information set (upside-down triangles). Then, the team’s expected payoff is
1/2× 0 + 1/4× 4 + 1/4× 1 = 5/4 > 1. This effect of i.i.d. signals was first noted by Isbell [11, 1957].
Under exchangeability, the team can do even better. For the signal distribution of Figure 10b, its
expected payoff is 1/2× 0 + 1/2× 4 = 2.
H2 T2 
H1 1/4 1/4 
T1 1/4 1/4 
H2 T2 
H1 0 1/2 
T1 1/2 0 
Figures 10 a, b
Cabello and Calsamiglia [5, 2005] also studied the game of Figure 1 and showed that the avail-
ability of quantum signals there allows a team to achieve an expected payoff of 2. We have just
seen that one does not need to resort to quantum signals in this tree to obtain this improvement.
However, one can easily build other Isbell trees where quantum signals can improve still further on
classical signals. For example, we could simply glue together the tree of Figure 7 (where quantum
signals improve on classical signals) and the tree of Figure 1 (where i.i.d. or exchangeable classical
signals improve on no signals). This would yield an Isbell tree where quantum signals improve on
all classical signals.
8 An Economic Application
A natural scenario in which team problems arise but direct communication is impossible is high-
frequency financial trading. As a concrete example of communication limitations in this setting,
consider two markets located in New York and Shanghai, respectively. Typically, a new trade is
accepted every 0.5 millisecond by the stock exchange servers. Even at the speed of light, communi-
cation between the two locations takes approximately 40 milliseconds. This makes classical arbitrage
impossible, since any information about prices on one exchange is already out of date once it reaches
the other exchange (Wissner-Gross and Freer [27, 2010]).
Now consider a team problem involving two markets (1 and 2) and two traders (Ann and Bob)
engaged in local high-frequency strategies. We assume that the traders are located at a significant
distance from each other and from the two markets. The distances are such that communication
prior to their trading decisions is too slow. We will show how access to quantum signals can enable
the two traders to improve their joint performance relative to any classical signals. The mechanism
is based on a well-studied quantum set-up going back to Bell [2, 1964] and discussed as a team
decision problem in La Mura [15, 2005].
There are three assets X, Y ,and Z, and, at each point in time, each trader needs to sell one of
the three assets (chosen with equal probability) against the other two. When Ann and Bob want
to sell the same asset, they do better trading on separate markets, in which case they get payoffs
of 0 (a normalization), rather than on the same market, where they would directly compete against
each other and get payoffs of −M . When Ann and Bob want to sell different assets, they do better
trading on the same market since each increases the demand for the asset the other wants to sell.
This yields both a payoff of +m, as compared with 0 if they trade on separate markets. We assume
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m < M . (This inequality makes sense since even if they sell different assets, they still compete in
purchasing the third one.)
If M is sufficiently large compared with m, any good pair of strategies for the traders must
preclude their selling the same asset on the same market. In fact, the following is optimal for the
traders. Ann goes to market 2 only when she needs to sell asset Z, while Bob goes to market 1 only
when he needs to sell Z. (By symmetry, we can replace Z by X or Y , and market 2 with market
1.) To calculate the resulting expected payoff to the traders, note that there are nine equally likely
cases according to whether Ann wants to sell asset X, Y , or Z, and similarly for Bob. In four of
these cases, the above strategy profile secures a payoff of +m, and otherwise 0. So, the expected
payoff is 4/9 ×m. This is under the assumption of no signals, but, since the scenario corresponds
to a Kuhn tree (with imperfect recall), we know from Proposition 5.2 that the addition of classical
signals cannot improve the baseline payoff.
Now bring in quantum information resources. Specifically, we give the traders access to an
entangled quantum system on which they can make certain measurements and thereby condition
their choices. Specifically, we assume that the system consists of two particles, one per trader,
prepared in the so-called Bell state.5 This gives rise to the following signal structure:
Up Down 
Up 0 1/2 
Down 1/2 0 
Pr= Up Down 
Up 3/8 1/8 
Down 1/8 3/8 
Pr≠
Figure 11
Each trader chooses one of three possible local measurements on the system, which, for conve-
nience, we also label X, Y , or Z. The left-hand table gives the probabilities of the joint outcomes
(each outcome can be Up or Down) when the traders make the same choice of measurement, and the
right-hand table gives the probabilities when they make different choices of measurement. Consider
the following strategy for Ann. If she wants to sell X, then she performs measurement X and, if she
observes Up, she executes the trade on market 1, while if she observes Down, she executes the trade
on market 2. Similarly, if Ann observes Y or Z, she performs the corresponding measurement and
acts accordingly. Bob adopts the same strategy. The expected payoff is calculated as follows. These
strategies always avoid selling the same asset on the same market. Moreover, in each of the six cases
where the traders want to sell different assets, they manage, with probability 3/8 + 3/8 = 3/4, to
trade on the same market. This leads to an expected payoff of 6/9× 3/4×m = 1/2×m, which is
greater than the baseline payoff of 4/9×m.
Appendix A Definition of a Kuhn Tree
The presentation in this section follows those in Hart [10, 1992] and Brandenburger [4, 2007].
Definition A.1 A (finite) Kuhn decision tree consists of:
5Bell [2, 1964]. This is a routine set-up in the laboratory.
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(a) A set of two players, one called the decision maker (DM) and the other called Nature.
(b) A finite rooted tree.
(c) A partition of the set of non-terminal nodes of the tree into two subsets denoted N (with typical
element n) and M (with typical element m). The members of N are called decision nodes,
and the members of M are called chance nodes.
(d) A partition of N (resp. M) into information sets denoted I (resp. J) such that for each I
(resp. J):
(i) all nodes in I (resp. J) have the same number of outgoing branches, and there is a given
1-1 correspondence between the sets of outgoing branches of different nodes in I (resp.J);
(ii) every path in the tree from the root to a terminal node crosses each I (resp. J) at most
once.
For each information set I (resp. J), number the branches going out of each node in I (resp. J)
from 1 through #I (resp. #J) so that the 1-1 correspondence in (d.i) above is preserved.
Definition A.2 A strategy (for the DM) associates with each information set I, an integer between
1 and #I, to be called the DM’s choice at I. Let S denote the set of strategies for the DM. A state
of the world (or state) associates with each information set J , an integer between 1 and #J to be
called the choice of Nature at J . Let Ψ denote the set of states.
Note that a pair (s, ψ) in S ×Ψ induces a unique path through the tree.
Definition A.3 Fix a node n in N and a strategy s. Say n is allowed under s if there is a state
ψ such that the path induced by (s, ψ) passes through n. Say an information set I is allowed under
s if some n in I is allowed under s.
Definition A.4 Say the DM has perfect recall if for any strategy s, information set I, and nodes
n and n∗ in I, node n is allowed under s if and only if node n∗ is allowed under s.
Definition A.5 Say a node n in N is non-trivial if it has at least two outgoing branches.
Define a relation of precedence on the DM’s information sets I, as follows: Given two information
sets I and I ′, say that I precedes I ′ if there are nodes n in I and n′ in I ′ such that the path from
the root to n′ passes through n. It is well known that if the DM has perfect recall and all decision
nodes are non-trivial, then this relation is irreflexive and transitive, and each information set I has
at most one immediate predecessor. (Proofs of these assertions can be found in Brandenburger [4,
2007, Appendix], or can be constructed from arguments in Wilson [26, 1972].)
Kuhn [14, 1953, p.213] observes that perfect recall implies that the DM remembers: (i) all of
his choices at previous information sets; and (ii) everything he knew at those information sets. The
following two lemmas formalize these observations. (The proofs are in [4, 2007, Appendix].)
Lemma A.6 Suppose the DM has perfect recall and all decision nodes are non-trivial. Fix infor-
mation sets I and I ′, and strategies s and s′. Suppose that I ′ is allowed under both s and s′, and I
precedes I ′. Then I is allowed under both s and s′, and s and s′ coincide at I.
Next, write:
[I] = {ψ : I is allowed under ψ}.
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Lemma A.7 Suppose the DM has perfect recall and all decision nodes are non-trivial. Fix infor-
mation sets I and I ′. If I ′ succeeds I, then [I ′] ⊆ [I].
We can now justify the entries in the first row of Table 1 in the text. Fix a perfect-recall tree
and an information set in the tree. Given that the DM remembers all of his choices at previous
information sets, and everything he knew at those information sets, the only effect of a signal
(classical or quantum) at the information set can be to change the DM’s probabilities about the
state of the world. But, we have assumed (see Section 5 in the text and Appendix B below)
independence between Nature and signals, so no such change is possible.
Appendix B Correlation Between Nature and Signals
Consider the imperfect-recall decision tree depicted in Figure B.1, and the joint distribution of a
coin toss at the team’s information set, and Nature’s move, depicted in Figure B.2. The team gets
an expected payoff of 1 (in fact, 1 almost surely) by choosing Left after Heads and Right after Tails.
Its expected payoff in the underlying tree is 1/2 (regardless of his strategy).
Left Right Left Right 
left right (1/2) (1/2) 
1 0 0 1 
Figure B.1
left right 
Heads 1/2 0 
Tails 0 1/2 
Figure B.2
This shows that Proposition 5.2 is false in the absence of the independence assumption between
Nature and signals.
Appendix C Non-Existence of a Joint Probability Space
It is instructive to see directly (rather than via appeal to Proposition 5.2) why the signal structure
of Figure 8 cannot be derived from a joint probability space (Ω, µ). We can take Ω to be as depicted
in Table C.1,6 so that µ is a probability measure on the set {ω0, . . . , ω15}. Now let’s try to derive the
6There is no loss of generality in taking Ω to be of this canonical form. This follows from starting with a general
(even infinite) probability space and taking the image measure.
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signal structure of Figure 8. The conditions PrI1I3(Tails1,Tails3) = 0, PrI2I3(Heads2,Heads3) = 0,
and PrI1I4(Heads1,Heads4) = 0 require, respectively:
µ(ω10) + µ(ω11) + µ(ω14) + µ(ω15) = 0,
µ(ω0) + µ(ω1) + µ(ω8) + µ(ω9) = 0,
µ(ω0) + µ(ω2) + µ(ω4) + µ(ω6) = 0,
while the condition PrI2I4(Heads2,Heads4) = Φ
5 > 0 requires:
µ(ω0) + µ(ω2) + µ(ω8) + µ(ω10) > 0,
which is then impossible.
I1 I2 I3 I4 
ω0 H1 H2 H3 H4 
ω1 H1 H2 H3 T4 
ω2 H1 H2 T3 H4 
ω3 H1 H2 T3 T4 
ω4 H1 T2 H3 H4 
ω5 H1 T2 H3 T4 
ω6 H1 T2 T3 H4 
ω7 H1 T2 T3 T4 
ω8 T1 H2 H3 H4 
ω9 T1 H2 H3 T4 
ω10 T1 H2 T3 H4 
ω11 T1 H2 T3 T4 
ω12 T1 T2 H3 H4 
ω13 T1 T2 H3 T4 
ω14 T1 T2 T3 H4 
ω15 T1 T2 T3 T4 
Table C.1
In quantum mechanics this impossibility argument is usually described as a strengthened version
of the famous Bell’s Theorem (Bell [2, 1964]). (The strengthening is precisely the point of Hardy [9,
1993].) The lesson of Bell’s Theorem is that quantum mechanics allows non-local correlation, that
is, dependence among particles that cannot be viewed as arising from common-cause correlation.
The common cause, if it existed, would arise from the operation of extra variables (usually called
hidden variables) equipped with a classical probability distribution. Since quantum mechanics
allows correlation that is not common-cause, and since particles can be physically distant from each
other at the point of measurement, the correlation is called non-local.
Non-existence of a joint probability space can be understood as arising from the incompatibility
of certain measurements on quantum systems. Measurements of position and momentum make the
most famous example. In the physical set-up underlying Figure 8, there are two incompatibilities
— one between the two different measurements on the first particle, and another between the two
different measurements on the second particle.
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